The simple model maintains that morally relevant factors combine in a simple, additive way, like weights on a scale. Although intuitive and familiar, this model entails that certain plausible views about particular cases and how morally relevant factors combine and interact therein are false. Shelly Kagan suggests that we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting either of two assumptions the simple model makes: that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto (additivity); and that neither the "weight" nor the "valence" of a factor's contribution can be affected by other factors (atomism). But is there an atomistic option, a way of accommodating the relevant views and interactions by rejecting additivity rather than atomism? I argue that developing an atomistic option requires offering a conception of contribution that renders coherent the particular claims that must be true if there is, indeed, such an option. And I consider whether Rossian pluralism-the locus classicus for the idea of a contributory right-making factor-offers the resources necessary to offer such a conception, and whether it could accommodate the relevant views and interactions other than by rejecting atomism.
Introduction
How do morally relevant factors combine and interact to make right acts right and wrong acts wrong? It's easy to assume that such factors combine in a simple, additive way, like weights on a scale. The right-making factors (e.g., LIFE-SAVING or PROMOTING-THE-OVERALL-GOOD) go on one side of the scale, so to speak, while the wrong-making factors (e.g., PROMISE-BREAKING or DOING-HARM) go on the other side. And the "balance" of these factors determines the moral statuses of † A draft of this paper was presented as "Can an Atomist Explain Why the Governing Function Is Not Additive?" at the Second Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics. I am grateful to Mark Timmons and members of that audience for helpful discussions thereof. I owe special thanks to two anonymous referees and to my colleagues at Southern Methodist University, especially Philippe Chuard, for their criticisms of subsequent drafts. the various options (their permissibility, impermissibility, etc.) . Call this, the simple model.
The simple model is an intuitive and familiar model (or theory) of how morally relevant factors combine and interact. Moreover, it coheres with an equally intuitive and familiar-albeit controversial-model (or theory) of moral deliberation, that figuring out what one ought morally to do is a matter of weighing the moral reasons for and against relevant alternatives with the aim of ascertaining which of those alternatives is favored by the balance of those reasons.
But the simple model is arguably too simple. For it's not consistent with certain plausible (albeit controversial) views about particular cases and how morally relevant factors combine and interact therein. To sketch but one example, one might think, not only that it's permissible to harm a wrongful aggressor in selfdefense, but also that SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from having the wrong-making effect it normally has even though it doesn't outweigh or counterbalance DOING-HARM (as, say, LIFE-SAVING arguably does in certain cases). But the simple model entails that this view is false (see §2).
How could we accommodate the aforementioned views and, in particular, the sorts of complex combinations and interactions they take to occur? In short, how could we accommodate the relevant views and interactions?
Shelly Kagan suggests that we could accommodate them by rejecting either of two (logically independent) assumptions made by the simple model, 1 which he refers to as "the assumption that the governing function is additive" (or "the additive assumption") and "the assumption of independent contributions" (or the "independence condition") (1998, 16-17, 20-1 n. 8) . To a first approximation, the object of my inquiry is whether we could, in fact, accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting the first of these assumptions rather than the second.
As I will understand it, the first of these assumptions is that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum (or net balance) of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto. 2 (Compare how the weights of each of the objects in the pans of a balance scale combine to determine whether and to which side that scale tips.) Hereinafter, I will refer to this first assumption as additivity. [A caveat: Kagan often refers to the conjunction of this first assumption and the next as "the assumption that the governing function is additive" (or "the additive assumption"). But all I mean by "additivity" is this first assumption. Moreover, 1 He calls it "the additive model." 2 "Each factor makes its own individual contribution to the status of the act, and the overall status is [determined by] the sum of these contributions"; " [T] he overall status of the act is [determined by] the sum of the separate contributions of the individual factors" (Kagan 1988, 15, 16) . unlike Kagan, I won't regard it as an assumption about a supposed "governing function."] As I will understand it, the second of these two assumptions is that neither the size nor the direction of a factor's contribution can be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors). 3 (Compare how neither the weight nor the placement of an object on a balance scale is affected by the other objects thereon.) So understood, it's the negation of two forms of moral holism. The first of these is valence holism, the view that the moral "valence" of a factor (or the direction of its contribution) may be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors) such that (e.g.) what is a right-making factor (a factor that makes a positive contribution) in one case may not be one in another, or may even be a wrongmaking factor (a factor that makes a negative contribution) given suitable circumstances. This first holism is a version of what Jonathan Dancy calls "the holism of the right-making relation" (2004, 79) . 4 The second is weight holism, the view that the moral "weight" of a factor (or the size of its contribution) may be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors) such that (e.g.) what is a right-making factor with a particular weight in one case may have more or less weight in another. 5 Hereinafter, I will refer to this second assumption as atomism. 6 Both additivity and atomism require further elucidation (see §2). But I can now state the object of my inquiry with greater precision. We could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting atomism-provided, that is, that weight and valence holism are tenable. Indeed, the relevant views are among the very sorts of views that are used to motivate holism: ones that appear to entail that one factor (e.g., SELF-DEFENSE or GUILT) can and does affect the valence or weight of another factor (e.g., DOING-HARM or SUFFERING) . But could we (also) accommodate them by rejecting additivity rather than atomism, as Kagan suggests? In other words, is there an atomistic option, a way of accommodating the relevant views and interactions without rejecting atomism? If there is, then the relevant 3 " [V] ariations in the other factors will not affect the contribution made by the factor in question" (16-17; see also 16 n. 7).
4 I take it to be the most plausible version of the holism of the right-making relation, which Dancy (implicitly) defines as the view that a feature that is a right-making reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another (2004, 74, 79) . The holism of the rightmaking relation should be distinguished from what Dancy calls "the holism of the favoring relation," which is a parallel view about normative reasons for action and belief, including distinctly moral reasons for action (2004, 79) . Unfortunately, these two holisms are frequently not distinguished, and it's not always possible to tell whether a particular author intends both or only one of them. I intend only the one.
5 Cf. Kamm's "Principle of Contextual Interaction," which states that "a property's role and, most important, its effect may differ with context" (1996, 51) . 6 For contemporary expressions and defenses of atomism see, e.g., Crisp 2000; Hooker 2008; Raz 2000. views don't entail holism. In which case, holists can't use them to motivate holism, at least not without further argument. And atomists could accept them as true, rather than reject them as false, as they currently do. Moreover, these views could be true even if weight and valence holism prove untenable.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers the simple model, its assumptions (additivity and atomism), and its limitations. Section 3 considers how we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting atomism in favor of weight and valence holism. Section 4 considers the suggestion that developing an atomistic option would involve replacing the simple model with an alternative one that assumes atomism but not additivity (see Kagan 1988, 20-1 & n. 8) . And section 5 argues that developing an atomistic option requires offering a conception of contribution-an account of just what it is that contributory right-making factors contribute-that renders coherent the particular claims that must be true if there is, indeed, such an option. Finally, section 6 considers whether Rossian pluralism-the locus classicus for the idea of a contributory right-making factor-offers the conceptual and metaphysical resources necessary to offer such a conception. In the process, it considers whether Rossian pluralism could accommodate the relevant views and interactions other than by rejecting atomism.
Before I proceed, a few points of clarification may be in order. First, by exploring ways of accommodating certain (admittedly controversial) views that the simple model entails are false, I don't mean to dismiss the possibility that the simple model is actually correct. And I certainly don't mean to suggest that either weight or valence holism is untenable, as I'm elsewhere engaged in their defense. But, here as elsewhere, exploring alternatives is simply good methodology. Moreover, exploring alternatives to the simple model is consistent with defending that model and its assumptions. For having first explored those alternatives, one might then defend the simple model by arguing that none of them is tenable. And though my arguments here do not show that there is no atomistic option, they do raise doubts about the tenability of such an option. Hence, they might ultimately contribute to just such a defense of the simple model. On the other hand, they might also contribute to the defense of weight and valence holism by helping to rule out an alternative way of accommodating the relevant views and interactions.
Second, I use the terms "holism" and "atomism" as they are generally used in the literature on moral particularism and moral generalism. In that literature, "holism" usually refers to either or both of (1) the holism of the right-making relation-of which valence holism is a version-or (2) a parallel view about normative reasons for action and belief (see n. 4). 7 Likewise, "atomism" usually refers to the negation of one or both of these views, although here I use it to refer to the negation of both valence and weight holism. I choose this terminology both because my arguments here bear directly on issues in that literature, and to retain terminological continuity with my other work. 8
The Simple Model, Its Assumptions and Limitations
To begin, let's consider a familiar (albeit controversial) view of the sort that all relevant parties will agree the simple model gets right. Suppose that I can't keep my promise to meet Able for a pint without failing to save Baker's life and, second, that Able will be disappointed if I don't meet him. And, to keep things simple, suppose that there are only three morally relevant factors here: PROMISE-KEEPING, LIFE-SAVING, and DISAPPOINTMENT. 9 These are contributory right-and wrong-making factors. Each makes a (positive or negative) contribution to the moral status of each of these (possible) acts, meeting Able and saving Baker. And the "balance" of these factors (or these contributions) determines the moral status of each of these acts, the rightness of saving Baker and the wrongness of meeting Able.
All of this is consistent with the simple model and, in particular, with both additivity and atomism. First, the moral status of each of these acts is determined by the sum (or net balance) of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto, which is just to say that the moral status of each of these acts is determined by how these contributions "add up" or "balance out," just as whether and to which side a balance scale tips is determined by how the weights of the objects in each of its pans "add up" or "balance out." Indeed, one could use a balance scale and three coins of appropriate weights to model how these three contributions determine the moral status of each of these acts: place a relatively heavy coin in one pan to represent the contributions made by LIFE-SAVING and place sufficiently lighter coins in the other pan to represent the contributions 7 See, e.g., Dancy 2004, chap. 5; McKeever and Ridge 2006, chap. 2; McNaughton 1988, 192-3; Robinson 2006; Väyrynen 2006, 717-18. 8 These same terms are used with different and variable meanings in the literature on intrinsic value and organic unities. See, e.g., Brown 2007; Hurka 1998 . Note also that what Brown calls "Additivism" (roughly, the view that the value of a whole is equal to the sum of the values of its parts) isn't analogous to additivity, in part because the value of a whole isn't analogous to the moral status of an act. (For instance, being morally required is at best analogous, not to being good "on the whole," but rather to being better than available alternatives.)made by PROMISE-KEEPING and DISAPPOINTMENT, and the scale will tip toward the first pan, indicating that saving Baker is right and that meeting Able is wrong. And what additivity claims is that the same holds true in all (possible) cases-that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto.
Second, neither the size nor the direction of any of the contributions made by these factors is affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors). For instance, LIFE-SAVING doesn't reduce the weight of PROMISE-KEEPING, or the size of the contribution it makes to the moral status of my meeting Able. Nor does it affect its valance, or the direction of that contribution. It just "outweighs" PROMISE-KEEPING, just as a heavier coin in one pan of a balance scale outweighs a lighter coin in the other. And what atomism claims is that the same holds true of all factors in all (possible) cases-that, contra weight and valence holism, neither the weight nor the valence of a factor can be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors).
Note two things. First, atomism, weight holism, and valence holism are all views about factors that are of fundamental (or non-derivative) moral relevance. Suppose, for example, that LIFE-SAVING is only of derivative relevance, and that the relevant fundamental factor is PREVENTING-HARM. In that case, atomism doesn't entail that other factors can't affect the weight or valence of LIFE-SAVING. Moreover, whenever I speak of factors, I am speaking of factors that are of fundamental moral relevance. (Which factors are of fundamental moral relevance is, of course, a matter of considerable dispute.) Second, atomism doesn't entail that a factor's weight and valence are invariable simpliciter. And I take it that the most plausible version of atomism will insist only that a factor's weight and valence can't be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors), and will reject the further claim that they can't be affected by variations in that factor. For example, it won't deny that the weight of DISAPPOINTMENT or DOING-HARM varies as the amount of resulting disappointment or harm varies (see Hooker 2008, 21) . And if, say, guilt and innocence are two possible values of a single factor, CULPABILITY, it won't deny that CULPABILITY can contribute either positively or negatively to the moral status of punishing a person, depending on whether that person is guilty or innocent (see Kagan 1988, 6 n. 3) . 10 Conversely, holism doesn't entail that there are no factors whose weights or valences cannot be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors). 11 Moreover, I take it that the most plausible versions of holism will allow that whether the weight or valance of a particular factor can be affected by other factors can be a contingent matter, because it can (in the case of at least some factors) depend on whether there are, in fact, any factors that are capable of affecting that particular factor's weight or valence. (Compare, for example, how whether a particular disposition can be masked 12 is contingent on the existence of something with the power to mask it.) Now, as the example above illustrates, the simple model assumes that we can distinguish the contribution a factor makes to the moral status of an act from the effect it has thereon. This distinction will be important in what follows. So it bears some attention.
The effect a factor has on the moral status of an act is just the difference it makes to that status. Suppose, for example, that I could both meet Able and save Baker. In that case, PROMISE-KEEPING would have a right-making effect on the moral status of my meeting Able: it would make the difference between what the moral status of this act is (required) and what that status would be in its absence (permissible). In this sense, PROMISE-KEEPING would make this act right. But in the case as described, PROMISE-KEEPING doesn't have this right-making effect: it doesn't make this act right. Or consider LIFE-SAVING. This factor has a rightmaking effect on the moral status of my saving Baker. But it also has a wrongmaking effect on the moral status of my meeting Able: it makes the difference between what the moral status of this act is (impermissible) and what that status would be in its absence (required). In this sense, LIFE-SAVING makes this act wrong. (Although in another sense, it's the overall "balance" of PROMISE-KEEPING, LIFE-SAVING, and DISAPPOINTMENT, or of the contributions they make, that makes this act wrong.) Now one might, of course, think that there's more to an act's moral status than merely its deontic status. 13 But my discussion will be confined to right-and wrong-making effects.
It's considerably harder to say just what the contribution a factor makes to the moral status of an act is. (Moreover, the view that right-and wrong-making factors are contributory factors is not uncontroversial.) Currently, manyincluding many atomists and holists-understand contributory factors in terms of moral reasons, as factors that provide moral reasons of various weights and valences. 14 On this view, the contribution a factor makes to the moral status of an act is the (pro tanto) moral reason that factor provides to perform or not to perform that act. This isn't how I prefer to think of these contributions, 15 but it will do as a first approximation. I will, however, continue to speak of contributions rather than moral reasons. (The reason for this will become apparent in the final sections of the paper.) Now let's consider two views that the simple model entails are false, both of which are offered by Kagan to show that it's controversial. 16 It should be said that these views are themselves controversial (as Kagan acknowledges). But the point here isn't that the simple model is false. Rather, the point is simply that it's not consistent with certain views, because these views imply that morally relevant factors can and do combine and interact in certain complex ways that the simple models entails they can't.
The first view makes three claims. First, there's no moral difference whatsoever between defending one's own life by pushing a wrongful aggressor into a pit, expecting the fall to kill him, and defending one's own life by not warning an aggressor that he is about to fall into a pit, expecting the fall to kill him. In particular, both of these acts-pushing the aggressor and not warning the aggressor-are permissible, and there's no other moral difference between them. Second, there's no moral difference between these acts because one factor, SELF-DEFENSE, prevents another factor, DOING-HARM, from having the moral effect(s)-i.e., making the moral difference(s)-it otherwise would. In particular, SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from making pushing the aggressor wrong, rather than permissible. Third, SELF-DEFENSE does not do this by making a contribution that combines additively with the negative contribution made by DOING-HARM-e.g., a positive contribution that counterbalances the latter's negative contribution. 17 The second view makes three claims about a case in which we can aid either Trixie or Fritz, both of whom are suffering because Trixie's scheme to harm Fritz went awry and harmed her more than it harmed Fritz. First, Trixie's greater suffering notwithstanding, we ought to aid Fritz rather than Trixie: aiding Trixie is wrong, rather than right. Second, this is so because GUILT prevents GREATER-SUFFERING from having the moral effect it otherwise would. In particular, her guilt prevents Trixie's greater suffering from making aiding her right, rather than wrong. Third, Trixie's guilt does not do this by making a contribution that combines additively with the positive contribution made by her greater suffering-e.g., a negative contribution that outweighs the latter's positive contribution. 18 The simple model entails that each of these views is false. It assumes that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto. (This is additivity.) But that's true only if each of the factors relevant to the moral status of an act makes a contribution thereto, which contribution combines additively with those of every other such factor to determine that act's moral status. And, on these views, that's not what SELF-DEFENSE and GUILT do: ex hypothesi, neither of these factors makes such a contribution. Rather, what they do is prevent other factors-DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING-from having the moral effects they otherwise would. And they don't do this in the way that, say, LIFE-SAVING prevents PROMISE-KEEPING from having the right-making effect it otherwise would on the moral status of my meeting Able. That is, they don't do this by making contributions that outweigh or counterbalance the contributions made by other factors. And that is the only way that the simple model allows that they could do this. Hence, the simple model entails that each of these views is false. Now, the claim that SELF-DEFENSE and GUILT don't make contributions that combine additively with the contributions made by other factors is ambiguous. Do they (a) make no contributions, or (b) make contributions that don't combine additively with the contributions made by other factors? This is a matter for stipulation. I would prefer to say b. But contributory factors are generally characterized as having weights and valences. And if we did say b, we would then need to distinguish between the kinds of contributions that the simple model contemplates (additive contributions?) and other kinds of contributions that it doesn't (non-additive contributions?). Thus, I'm going to say a, they make no contributions. But we should keep in mind that on some accounts of what's going on in these cases it might be more natural to say b, rather than a. Moreover, when I say that a factor "makes no contribution," I'm not denying that it makes a contribution that doesn't combine additively with the contributions made by other factors. On the contrary, I'm asserting it.
Finally, these views are (as I said) controversial. And proponents of the simple model would say what atomists typically say about these and similar views. 19 Some would say that such views are mistaken about how SELF-DEFENSE and GUILT 18 "It will seem more appropriate to view the factor guilt/innocence not as making an independent contribution, but rather as a multiplier-this one able to range from one to zero" (Kagan 1988, 20) . 19 See, e.g., Crisp 2000; Hooker 2008. prevent DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING from having the effects they otherwise would. They do this, they would say, by making contributions-e.g., contributions that counterbalance or outweigh the contributions made by DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING. Others would say that these views misidentify the relevant factors. For example, they might say that the relevant factors aren't DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING, but rather DOING-UNDESERVED-HARM and GREATER-UNDESERVED-SUFFERING. But, as I said, the point here isn't that the simple model is false. Rather, the point is that it's not consistent with these views. Moreover, this isn't because these views imply that contributory factors can be complex factors that require fine-grained descriptions (e.g., DOING-UNDESERVED-HARM). For these views imply nothing one way or the other about how complex contributory factors can be. Rather, it's because these and similar views imply that morally relevant factors can and do combine and interact in certain complex ways that the simple model entails they can't. 20
The Holistic Option
Now one might assume that atomism is by definition committed to rejecting the foregoing views as false. It's certainly true that atomists do reject them as false. And it might be that some think of atomism in such a way that it is, by definition, committed to doing so. For example, some might think of atomism as the view that a factor can't have an effect, or make a moral difference, in one case unless it has that same effect, or makes that same difference, in any case. But we can't think of atomism in that way without (e.g.) thinking that Ross, who is supposed to be the paradigmatic valence atomist, is a holist simply because he allows that some factors can outweigh others. And if by "atomism" we understand the view that neither the size nor the direction of a factor's contribution can be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors), then it's simply false that atomism is by definition committed to rejecting either the foregoing views or others that take morally relevant factors to combine and interact in similarly complex ways. Moreover, Kagan suggests that we could accommodate such views and the sorts of complex combinations and interactions they take to occur-i.e., the relevant views and interactions-by rejecting additivity rather than atomism. But before we consider Kagan's suggestion, it will help to first consider the option he mentions in a footnote but doesn't explore: accommodating the relevant views and interactions by rejecting atomism (1988, 20 n. 8) . For understanding this holistic option will make understanding and assessing Kagan's suggestion easier.
First, consider the view that SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from making pushing the aggressor wrong, rather than permissible. If we reject atomism in favor of valence holism, we can attribute this (posited) variation in the moral effect of DOING-HARM to a variation in its moral valence that is due to SELF-DEFENSE. On this holistic view (call it H1), DOING-HARM doesn't have the wrongmaking effect it otherwise would because it doesn't have the negative valance it otherwise would: it doesn't make pushing the aggressor wrong because it doesn't make the negative contribution to the moral status of pushing the aggressor that it otherwise would. (Or, if you prefer, it doesn't provide the moral reason not to push the aggressor that it otherwise would.) Moreover, this variation in valance is due to SELF-DEFENSE: SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from having the negative valence it otherwise would (i.e., it's a disabler). On this view, SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from having the wrong-making effect it would otherwise have by preventing it from having the negative valence it would otherwise have, or making the negative contribution it would otherwise make.
Next, consider the view that her guilt prevents Trixie's greater suffering from making aiding her right, rather than wrong. If we reject atomism in favor of weight holism, we can attribute this (posited) variation in the moral effect of GREATER-SUFFERING to a variation in its moral weight that is due to GUILT. On this holistic view (call it H2), Trixie's greater suffering doesn't have the rightmaking effect it otherwise would because it has less weight than it otherwise would: it doesn't make aiding Trixie right because it makes a smaller positive contribution to the moral status of aiding her than it otherwise would. (Or, if you prefer, it provides less moral reason to aid her than it otherwise would.) Moreover, this variation in weight is due to Trixie's guilt: her guilt reduces the weight of her suffering (i.e., it's an attenuator). On this view, Trixie's guilt prevents her greater suffering from having the right-making effect it would otherwise have by reducing its weight, or the size of the positive contribution it makes.
Finally, consider the following view, which is an alternative to the previous one. Because it's due to her wickedness, rather than merely her own wrongdoing, Trixie's greater suffering has a wrong-making effect on the moral status of aiding her: rather than (merely) failing to make aiding her right, Trixie's greater suffering makes aiding her wrong (and would do so even if we could aid her after first aiding Fritz). If we reject atomism in favor of valence holism, we could attribute this (posited) variation in the moral effect of GREATER-SUFFERING to a variation in its moral valence that is due to WICKEDNESS. On this holistic view (call it H3), Trixie's greater suffering has a wrong-making effect on the moral status of aiding her because it has a negative valence: it makes aiding Trixie wrong because it makes a negative contribution to the moral status of aiding her. (Or, if you prefer, it provides a moral reason not to aid her.) Moreover, this variation in valence is due to Trixie's wickedness: her wickedness reverses the valence of her suffering (i.e., it's a reverser). On this view, Trixie's wickedness reverses the effect that Trixie's greater suffering has by reversing its valence, or the direction of the contribution it makes.
Notice that these holistic views are not additive views. For they entail that additivity is false. Now, holism itself doesn't entail that additivity is false. Suppose that some factor both makes a contribution and affects either the weight or the valence of another factor (the size or the direction of its contribution). In that case, atomism would be false, but it could still be true that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto.
But these holistic views do entail that additivity is false, because each supposes that some factor that is relevant to the moral status of an act doesn't make a contribution thereto, but rather (only) affects the weight or valence of another factor (and thereby the effect it has). For instance, if-as H2 claims-Trixie's guilt makes no contribution, but rather reduces the weight of her greater suffering, then the moral status of aiding Trixie is not determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto. 21 For at least one of those factors makes no contribution. Likewise, if-as H1 claims-SELF-DEFENSE makes no contribution, but rather prevents DOING-HARM from making the (negative) contribution it otherwise would, then the moral status of pushing the aggressor is not determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto.
It bears noting that these holistic views are consistent with the following assumption, which is considerably weaker than additivity: the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by those factors that make contributions thereto. (Which isn't to say that this weaker assumption is warranted.) For this weaker assumption allows that some factors don't make contributions, but rather (only) affect the weights and valences of other factors. Thus, none of our holistic views entails either that what Selim Berker (2007) calls "the combinatorial function" isn't additive or that there's no such function. 22 Berker defines the combinatorial function as "the function that takes as inputs the [possibly holistically-determined] valence and weight of all the reasons present in a given possible situation and gives as output the rightness and wrongness of each action available in that situation" (120). Since what Berker means by a "reason" here is what I mean by a contributory factor (115-18), the claim that there is an additive combinatorial function entails only that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by those factors that make contributions thereto. And none of our holistic views entails that there isn't an additive combinatorial function, much less that there's no combinatorial function. 23 However, I mention this only to lay it aside. In what follows, I won't be concerned with whether there's a combinatorial function or whether, if there is one, it's additive.
Non-Additive Models
As the foregoing illustrates, we could accommodate the relevant views and interactions by rejecting atomism. But the object of my inquiry is Kagan's suggestion that we could also do this by rejecting additivity rather than atomism: the possibility of an atomistic option. Unfortunately, Kagan doesn't develop such an option (presumably because doing so isn't necessary to his project, which is to criticize arguments that presuppose both additivity and atomism). Nor is he particularly clear about how it would differ from the holistic option. So we must do some work before we can assess its prospects.
I begin with the suggestion that developing an atomistic option would involve not only rejecting additivity and the simple model along with it, but also replacing the simple model with an alternative one that assumes atomism but not additivity (Kagan 1988, 20-1 & n. 8) . Now Kagan doesn't develop such a model himself. But we can get a rough, but good-enough idea of how one might work by considering some simple (and rather crude) non-additive models, which adapt his suggestion that SELF-DEFENSE and GUILT act more like "multipliers"-i.e., like the variable x in the equation S = x × y + z-than factors that make contributions that combine additively with those made by DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING (19). 24 23 It follows that the "combinatorial function" could be additive even if additivity is false. Thus, the question Berker considers (which is whether there is a coherent conception of a reason for action that is consistent with both valence holism and the view that "the combinatorial function…is not finitely expressible (and so…not additive)" [122, ) is orthogonal to the questions I consider here. 24 Berker (2007) describes some non-additive models, but they model "combinatorial functions" and, thus, aren't applicable (see above).
First, consider the view that SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from making pushing the aggressor wrong, rather than permissible. And consider the following model, which treats SELF-DEFENSE as a "zero multiplier." 25
To capture the view in question, we must make some stipulations. First, E represents the effect, if any, that DOING-HARM has on the moral status of an act A that involves doing harm. Negative values indicate a wrong-making effect: E < 0 if DOING-HARM makes A wrong. And zero indicates no effect: E = 0 if DOING-HARM makes no difference to A's moral status. Second, d represents DOING-HARM and, in particular, the effect it has on acts that involve doing harm in the absence of perturbing factors (e.g., SELF-DEFENSE) . Since this effect is a wrong-making one, d is a negative number. Third, s represents SELF-DEFENSE. It equals zero (is a "zero multiplier") if A is an act of self-defense; otherwise, it equals one. Given these stipulations, M1 represents SELF-DEFENSE as a factor that (when present) prevents DOING-HARM from making acts that involve doing harm wrong. If A is not an act of self-defense, s equals one; so the value of E is the same as the value of d, which is negative.
In other words, if A is not an act of self-defense, DOING-HARM makes A wrong. But if A is an act of self-defense, s equals zero; so the value of E is zero.
In other words, SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from making A wrong. Hence, M1 captures the view that SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from making pushing the aggressor wrong, rather than permissible. Moreover, M1 is not additive (in the relevant sense): it doesn't assume that the moral status of an act is determined by the sum of the contributions made by each of the factors relevant thereto.
Next, consider the view that her guilt prevents Trixie's greater suffering from making aiding her right, rather than wrong. And consider the following model, which treats GUILT as "a multiplier…[that can] range from one to zero." 26
Here, too, we must make some stipulations. First, E represents the effect, if any, that a person P1's greater suffering has on the moral status of aiding her rather than another person P2, who is suffering less. Values greater than some threshold value t, a positive number, indicate a right-making effect: E > t if GREATER-SUFFERING makes aiding P1 right. And values equal to or less than t indicate no effect: E ≤ t if GREATER-SUFFERING makes no difference to the moral status of aiding P1. Second, s represents GREATER-SUFFERING and, in particular, the effect it has on aiding one who is suffering more rather than another who is suffering less in the absence of perturbing factors (e.g., GUILT) . Since this effect is a rightmaking one, s is greater than t. Third, g represents GUILT and, in particular, P1's degree of guilt, or culpability. It is less than one but greater than or equal to zero if P1 is guilty to some degree; otherwise, it equals one.
Given these stipulations, M2 represents GUILT as a factor that can (when present) prevent GREATER-SUFFERING from making aiding one who is suffering more rather than another who is suffering less right. If P1 is not guilty, g equals one; so the value of E is the same as the value of s, which is greater than t.
In other words, if P1 is not guilty, GREATER-SUFFERING makes aiding P1 right. But if P1 is guilty, g is less than one; so the value of E is less than the value of s.
Moreover, for some values of g (including zero), E will be less than t. In other words, if P1 is sufficiently guilty, GUILT prevents GREATER-SUFFERING from making aiding P1 right. Hence, M2 can capture the view that her guilt prevents Trixie's greater suffering from making aiding her right, rather than wrong. Moreover, M2 is not additive (in the relevant sense).
Finally, M2 can be modified to capture the alternative view that, because it's due to her own wickedness, Trixie's greater suffering makes aiding her wrong. We need only stipulate (1) that g is less than zero if and only if P1's greater suffering is due to her own wickedness, rather than merely her own wrongdoing, 27 and (2) that negative values of E indicate that P1's greater suffering has a wrong-making effect on the moral status of aiding her: E < 0 if GREATER-SUFFERING makes aiding P1 wrong.
On this revised model (call it M3), if P1's greater suffering is due to her own wickedness, g is less than zero; so the value of E is negative. (Note that s > 0.)
In other words, WICKEDNESS reverses the effect that GREATER-SUFFERING has on the moral status of aiding P1. Hence, M3 can capture the (alternative) view that, because it's due to her own wickedness, Trixie's greater suffering makes aiding her wrong. Moreover, like M1 and M2, M3 is not additive (in the relevant sense). Now (as I said) these models are crude. For instance, they represent the effect that a particular factor has on the moral status of an act as being determined by itself and a second factor, which is not generally the case. Moreover, unlike the simple model, none is a general model of how morally relevant factors combine and interact. Nevertheless, they do give us a rough idea of how an alternative to the simple model might work and, in particular, of how the specifically nonadditive aspects of such a model might work. And for present purposes, that's all we need. For it allows us to see that alternative models are of no help in developing an atomistic option.
First, consider that non-additive models as such don't assume atomism and, in particular, that these models don't. Take M1, for instance. M1 represents SELF-DEFENSE as a factor that (when present) prevents DOING-HARM from making acts that involve doing harm wrong. But M1 makes no assumptions about the means by which SELF-DEFENSE does this. True, it doesn't represent SELF-DEFENSE as doing this by preventing it from making the (negative) contribution it otherwise would. But neither does it represent SELF-DEFENSE as doing this by some other means. If an act A that involves doing harm is an act of self-defense, s equals zero and the value of E is 0, indicating that SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from making A wrong. And this is so even if, as H1 claims, SELF-DEFENSE does this by preventing that other factor from making the (negative) contribution it otherwise would. Moreover, the same is true, mutatis mutandis, of M2 and M3, which make no assumptions about the means by which GUILT and WICKEDNESS alter the effect of Trixie's greater suffering.
Next, consider the objection that all this shows is that these are the wrong models. What we want aren't non-additive models. Rather, what we want are non-additive models that assume atomism. M1-M3 treat SELF-DEFENSE and GUILT as multipliers of the effects that DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING have in the absence of perturbing factors, like SELF-DEFENSE and GUILT. But what we need are models that treat them as multipliers of the contributions that DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING make in the absence of perturbing factors, which-if atomism is true-are the same contributions they make in the presence of such factors. Unlike these (merely) non-additive models, such models would be of help in developing an atomistic option. Or so goes the objection.
But such models would be of no such help. What's a multiplier of the contribution that a factor makes in the absence of perturbing factors? One thing it could be is (1) a factor that affects the size or direction of another factor's contribution. But if atomism is true, it can't be that. The only other thing it could be is (2) a factor that alters the effect that another factor has other than by altering the contribution that second factor makes (its size or direction). But that tells us precisely nothing we didn't already know. For we already knew that accommodating the relevant views and interactions by denying additivity rather than atomism requires saying that SELF-DEFENSE and GUILT alter the effects that DOING-HARM and GREATER-SUFFERING have other than by altering the contributions they make. Moreover, the proposed models would assume atomism only if we stipulated that the multipliers are of the second type, rather than the first.
And there's the rub. For-as I will now argue-we don't know whether we can make that stipulation. More specifically, we don't know whether what it says is coherent.
The Rub and the Challenge
First, let's review what developing an atomistic option requires us to say. What it requires us to say is that one factor (e.g., SELF-DEFENSE) can alter the effect that another factor (e.g., DOING-HARM) has other than by doing one of the following:
(i) making a contribution of its own-e.g., one that outweighs the contribution made by that second factor; or
(ii) altering the contribution that second factor makes (its size or direction).
Second, what the aforementioned stipulation says is that a multiplier of the contribution that a factor makes in the absence of perturbing factors is a factor that alters the effect that another factor has other than by doing (ii). But the rub is that we don't know whether we can coherently say either of these things. For whether we can coherently say them depends on whether there's a conception of contribution, an account of just what the contribution a factor makes to the moral status of an act is, that renders these assertions coherent. Now, to see that this is the rub, we need only suppose (contra the simple model and all relevant parties) that the contribution/effect distinction is merely terminological-i.e., that the contribution a factor makes to the moral status of an act is nothing other than the effect it has thereon under a different description. In that case, the key claim-that one factor can (or does) alter the effect that another factor has other than by doing (ii), altering the contribution that second factor makes-is incoherent. For given this effect conception of contribution, to alter the effect that another factor has just is to alter the contribution that it makes. Now it might be said that holism-and even the simple model-are in much the same boat, that absent a suitable conception of contribution, we don't know whether the claims they make about how one factor can alter the effect that another factor has are coherent. But while that's true, it's irrelevant. For the object of inquiry is the possibility of an atomistic option. And what we would need to develop such an option is a conception of contribution that renders coherent the claims it makes.
Call the challenge of offering such a conception the "Challenge." And note that it has two parts, because a suitable conception of contribution must both (a) identify what a factor's contribution is such that it's something other than the effect it has, and (b) render coherent the claim that one factor can alter the effect that another factor has other than by doing either (i) or (ii).
Obviously, atomists as such bear no obligation to meet this challenge. They may choose, instead, to defend the simple model. (Although even that requires meeting the first part of the Challenge.) But developing an atomistic option would require meeting it. Moreover, we can't, ex ante, rule out the possibility that it can be met. We can only consider possible conceptions of contribution to determine whether they are suitable ones. And that some aren't doesn't show that none is. Thus, we should inquire whether atomists could meet the Challenge.
Could Rossian Atomists Meet the Challenge?
In this final section, I consider whether Rossian pluralism offers the conceptual and metaphysical resources that atomists would need to meet the Challenge. I focus on Rossian pluralism for a number of reasons, of which I'll mention two. First, Ross's The Right and the Good (1930) is the locus classicus for the idea of a contributory right-making factor. He maintains that various factors can contribute to the prima facie rightness or wrongness of an act, and that the right act in any given situation is the one "whose prima face rightness…most outweighs its prima facie wrongness…" (46). Second, discussions of valence holism originated in particularist critiques of Rossian pluralism, critiques that objected to its (supposed) valence atomism. 28 Thus, Rossian pluralism is a natural place to begin an inquiry into whether atomists could meet the Challenge.
Contrary to what the term "prima facie" suggests, it's clear that prima facie rightness is not apparent rightness (1930, 19-20; 1939, 84-5) . But there are different ways of understanding just what it is, or different conceptions of prima facie rightness. So I'll consider whether atomists could appeal to some conception of prima facie rightness to meet the Challenge. And in the process, I'll consider whether Rossian pluralism could accommodate the relevant views and interactions other than by rejecting atomism. 29 On one conception, prima facie rightness is "conditional rightness," the property, not necessarily of being right but of being something that is right if the act has no other morally relevant characteristic…. (1930, 138) On this conditional conception, prima facie rightness is the property of being right "where other considerations do not enter the case" (135).
At first blush, conditional rightness and conditional wrongness might seem like what atomists would need to meet the Challenge. Consider an act that DOING-HARM makes wrong-e.g., whatever Trixie did that harmed Fritz. Such an act is conditionally wrong: it has the characteristic of being wrong if its only morally relevant characteristic is that it involves doing harm. Moreover, its conditional wrongness is something different from the effect that DOING-HARM has on its moral status. Now consider pushing the aggressor, which DOING-HARM doesn't make wrong because SELF-DEFENSE prevents it from doing so. The same is true of it. It's conditionally wrong, and its conditional wrongness is something different from the effect, if any, that doing-harm has on its moral status (which we are supposing is none). And, as this shows, its conditional wrongness is unaffected by SELF-DEFENSE. Moreover, we may suppose that SELF-DEFENSE doesn't counterbalance or outweigh DOING-HARM, but merely prevents it from making pushing the aggressor wrong.
But atomists would need more than conditional rightness and wrongness to meet the Challenge. For an act's conditional rightness or wrongness isn't itself a contribution to its moral status. And an act's being conditionally right or wrong doesn't guarantee that the ground of its conditional rightness or wrongness makes a contribution to its moral status. Suppose, as H1 claims, that SELF-DEFENSE prevents DOING-HARM from making pushing the aggressor wrong by preventing it from making the negative contribution it otherwise would to its moral status. In that case, pushing the aggressor is conditionally wrong, but the characteristic that grounds its conditional wrongness (DOING-HARM) makes no contribution to its moral status.
On a second conception, prima facie rightness is a dispositional property, the "tendency to be right" (1939, 79) . This fits Ross's characterization of "prima facie duties" both as acts that tend to be duties and as acts that tend to be right, as well as the analogy he draws between the moral tendencies of such acts and the physical tendencies of bodies subject to gravitation and other physical forces (1930, 18 n. 1, 28-9, 46; 1939, 86, 89) . On this dispositional conception, prima facie rightness is the tendency or disposition to be right. And an act can tend to be right without being right, just as a body can tend to move in line with a given force without so moving (1939, 86) .
Here, too, this dispositional conception of prima facie rightness and a correlative conception of prima facie wrongness might seem like what atomists would need to meet the Challenge. But again, atomists would need more than a tendency to be right or wrong to meet the Challenge. For such a tendency isn't itself a contribution to an act's moral status. And an act's having such a tendency doesn't guarantee that the ground of that tendency makes a contribution to its moral status. Suppose, for example, that the following is correct. Pushing the aggressor involves doing harm. This characteristic (DOING-HARM) grounds a tendency in this act to be wrong-a tendency that would, in the absence of perturbing factors, manifest, thereby making it wrong. But pushing the aggressor is an act of self-defense. And this second characteristic (SELF-DEFENSE) is a perturbing factor: it masks that tendency, thereby preventing it from manifesting. 30 If this view is correct, then pushing the aggressor has a tendency to be wrong. But there's no guarantee that DOING-HARM does anything beyond grounding this (masked) tendency, such as making a (negative) contribution to its moral status. Now one might well argue that this is the wrong way to think about the tendency to be right and the tendency to be wrong. One might argue that we should understand these tendencies in the way that Ross suggests, as analogous to the tendencies of bodies subject to physical forces. On this view, these tendencies are consequent upon moral forces. Or one might argue that we should understand these tendencies as moral forces (Brink 1994, 19-20) . 31 In either case, atomists might then attempt to meet the Challenge by identifying a factor's contribution with a moral force contributed by that factor. In which case, their atomism would amount to the view that right-and wrong-making factors contribute moral forces whose magnitudes and directions can't be affected by other factors (or by variations in other factors).
If tenable, this third, force conception of prima facie rightness would provide atomists with what they need to meet the first part of the Challenge: something to identify with a factor's contribution that isn't the effect it has, a moral force. But there would seem to be nothing in this conception that would allow atomists to meet the second part of the Challenge, which-in this iteration-is to render coherent the claim that one factor can alter the effect that another factor has other than by (i′) contributing a force of its own or (ii′) altering the force contributed by that second factor (its magnitude or direction). Consider that Trixie's suffering is greater than Fritz's. Atomists must, therefore, say that her suffering contributes a greater positive moral force than Fritz's suffering does. But then how could they allow that we ought to aid Fritz instead-that the balance of moral forces favors aiding him? It would be false to the (stipulated) facts of the case to say that Trixie's guilt contributes a third force that combines with the force generated by Fritz's suffering to defeat the force generated by Trixie's suffering (or that we've misidentified the relevant factors). For one of those facts is that Trixie's guilt makes no contribution (contributes no force). And it seems incoherent to say that Trixie's guilt (somehow) alters the balance of forces without either contributing a force or (à la weight holism) altering the magnitude of the force contributed by her suffering.
Moreover, this form of atomism is itself false to the (stipulated) facts of our examples. Suppose (as per this form of atomism) that neither the magnitude nor the direction of the moral force contributed by Trixie's suffering is affected by her guilt. In that case, we ought to aid Trixie rather than Fritz, because that's what the balance of moral forces favors. Moreover, if we aid Fritz instead, we have as much cause to (e.g.) regret or apologize for not aiding Trixie as we would if she were innocent and we failed to aid her. 32 But all of this is false to the (stipulated) facts of the example: we ought to aid Fritz rather than Trixie; and if that's what we ought to do, then we either have no cause to regret or apologize for not aiding Trixie or else we have less cause to do so than we would if she were innocent and we failed to aid her. Or take the view that there's no moral difference whatsoever between (a) pushing the aggressor and (b) not warning the aggressor. If neither the magnitude nor the direction of the moral force contributed by DOING-HARM were affected by SELF-DEFENSE, then there would be a moral difference between a and b, and one would have more cause to (e.g.) regret a than b.
Given the foregoing, I conclude that atomists couldn't appeal to either the dispositional conception or the force conception of prima facie rightness to meet the Challenge.
On a fourth conception, prima facie rightness is moral suitability or fitness, not to a particular situation, but rather to some aspect thereof (1939, . More specifically, it's the (relational) property of being "morally suitable to a certain degree, and in a certain respect" (52-3). This fits Ross's partial definition of rightness, which identifies rightness with "the greatest amount of [moral] suitability possible in the circumstances" (53). On this suitability conception, prima facie rightness is the moral suitability or "fitness…of an…act in certain respects" (84). And a particular act is prima facie right in a particular situation just to the degree that it fits aspects of that situation.
Here, too, we might grant that this conception provides atomists with what they need to meet the first part of the Challenge: a degree of suitability or unsuitability. But here, too, there would seem to be nothing in it that would allow them to meet the second part, which-in this iteration-is to render coherent the claim that one factor can alter the effect that another factor has other than by (i″) contributing a degree of suitability or unsuitability itself or (ii) altering the contribution that second factor makes (its size or direction). Given that Trixie's suffering is greater than Fritz's, atomists must say that aiding her is more suitable than aiding Fritz in that respect. But then how could they allow that we ought to aid Fritz instead-that aiding Fritz is more suitable than aiding Trixie? It would be false to the (stipulated) facts to say that Trixie's guilt makes aiding her unsuitable in another respect (or that we've misidentified the relevant factors). And it seems incoherent to say that her guilt (somehow) makes aiding Trixie less suitable than aiding Fritz without either contributing a degree of unsuitability to aiding Trixie or (à la weight holism) reducing the degree to which her suffering makes it suitable.
On a fifth conception, prima facie rightness is pro tanto moral reasonableness. Although Ross himself never characterizes either prima facie rightness or the correlative notion of a "prima facie duty" in terms of reasons, many others do. 33 Philip Stratton-Lake's account is representative.
For an act to be prima facie right is…for [it] to have some feature that gives us a moral reason to do it. (2002, xxxiii-iv) On this reasons conception, prima facie rightness is the property of being favored by a moral reason, which property an act may have even if it's not favored by the "balance" of such reasons.
Again, we might grant that this conception provides atomists with what they need to meet the first part of the Challenge: a degree of reasonableness. But again, there would seem to be nothing in it that would allow them to meet the second part. Indeed, for present purposes, the reasons conception seems not to be relevantly different from the suitability conception.
Finally, we might add that atomism about moral reasons is also false to the (stipulated) facts of our examples. Suppose (as per such atomism) that neither the weight nor the valence of the moral reason provided by Trixie's suffering is affected by her guilt. In that case, we ought to aid Trixie rather than Fritz, because that's what the balance of moral reasons favors. Moreover, if we aid Fritz instead, we have as much cause to (e.g.) regret or apologize for not aiding Trixie as we would if she were innocent and we failed to aid her. 34 But all of this is false to the (stipulated) facts of the example. Or take the view that there's no moral difference whatsoever between (a) pushing the aggressor and (b) not warning the aggressor. If neither the weight nor the valence of the moral reason provided by DOING-HARM were affected by SELF-DEFENSE, then there would be a moral difference between a and b, and one would have more cause to (e.g.) regret a than b.
Given the foregoing, I conclude that atomists couldn't appeal to either the suitability conception or the reasons conception of prima facie rightness to meet the Challenge. And I'm aware of no other conception of prima facie rightness that might do the trick. And so I conclude both that Rossian pluralism lacks the conceptual and metaphysical resources that atomists would need to meet the Challenge, and that Rossian pluralism could accommodate the relevant views and interactions only by rejecting atomism. However, it bears repeating that my arguments here don't show that there is no atomistic option. For we can't, ex ante, rule out the possibility that the Challenge can be met. And that Rossian pluralism lacks the resources that atomists would need to meet it doesn't entail that it can't be met. 35 
